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Abstract—Despite several iconic innovations in wireless networks, cellular service still remains largely unreliable with
regards to non-urban network coverage. Cellular providers often
need to make roaming agreements among each other for serving
their customers with basic connectivity in areas where they do
not have coverage. Considering all the technical limitations of
domestic roaming, we present a “wireless peering” model for
settlement-free spectrum sharing. It allows providers to extend
their coverage to “off-network” regions without any hardware
modifications. Its software-defined nature makes the model highly
scalable, easy to deploy and cost-effective. Simulation results
show a significant improvement in off-network wireless speed,
data allowance, and network coverage as well as increase in
provider revenue when compared to roaming.
Index Terms—Spectrum Policy, Peering, Roaming, Opportunistic Access, Cellular Networks, Resource Allocation.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Cellular providers have low motivation to expand their
infrastructure to non-urban areas, because of an imbalance
between the required investment and monetary return. Only
19% of the entire United States (US) population lives in
rural areas, which comprise approximately 95% of the total
US land mass [1]. As a result, people living in or visiting
rural and remote areas suffer from inferior Quality-of-Service
(QoS) [2]. We propose an architecture that enhances enduser experience by allowing service providers to “peer” and
share the already-established Base Stations (BSs) to serve each
others’ customers. Customers can get cellular service in areas
where peered providers have coverage without any off-network
restrictions, such as a reduction in allowed call times, lower
access speeds, or decreased data caps. As a long-term effect,
cellular providers will be highly motivated to improve their
service in low-population areas due to the implicit incentives
in the form of improved service for their customers elsewhere.
A. What is Peering?
Peering is a well-known concept among Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) in the wired Internet market [3]. It enables connecting and exchanging network traffic among Autonomous Systems (ASes) directly without paying to transit
ISPs or relying on a third-party service. While the technical
details vary depending on the different types of peering, the
core idea remains the same: collaboration among providers [4].
Settlement-free peering enables ISPs to share their resources
and reciprocally serve each other’s customers. Among other
benefits, peering improves the end-user experience by reducing
This work was supported in part by U.S. National Science Foundation award
1814086.
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Fig. 1: Alice and Bob can connect using a transit link through
AS T or directly using a peering link. Transit link implies a
payment to the transit ISP.
network congestion and end-to-end latency and helps ISP
admins reduce transit costs.
We explain the peering benefits among two ISPs each having an AS. In Fig. 1, customers of AS A can reach customers
of AS B by paying AS T for a transit link (A → T → B).
Another option is to directly use a settlement-free peering link
(A → B). For AS A, peering with AS B will be economically
beneficial if the monetary cost of the peering link is lesser
than the cost of using transit link [5]. We define ρtA→B as the
transit cost of sending traffic from AS A to AS B via AS T ,
which includes the money transit provider T charges A for
carrying its traffic to B. We define ρB→A as the peering cost
of receiving traffic from AS B to AS A which includes the
indirect costs incurred on A because of handling B’s traffic.
If ρB→A < ρtA→B , AS A will be willing to peer with AS B.
In order for a peering relationship to be viable, a reciprocal
situation should be happening for B, i.e., ρA→B < ρtB→A .
If these willingness conditions are satisfied for both A and
B, then establishing a peering relationship reduces the social
cost associated with carrying two-way traffic between A and
B, since ρA→B + ρB→A < ρtA→B + ρtB→A will also satisfy.
B. Contributions
We introduce the concept of wireless peering by drawing
motivation from ISP peering in wireline networks and designing a model using the same core ideas in cellular service
providers. In particular, this paper makes the following key
contributions: (1) Design a light-weight and effective peering
model for wireless networks that is easy to deploy; (2) Define

Customer Satisfaction Score (CSAT) for quantifying the effect
of change in cellular QoS; (3) Formulation of a wireless
peering optimization problem to select the best places to peer
for a cellular provider; (4) Proof of NP-hardness of the peering
optimization problem and design of heuristic solutions; and (5)
Design a cellular network simulation model which we use for
evaluating the proposed peering model and heuristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In §II, we
provide background for the proposed wireless peering concept,
cover the related works and state-of-the-art policy/mechanisms
on incentivizing collaboration among cellular providers. Next,
in §III, we detail our proposed wireless peering model and
compare it with the existing roaming framework. Then, in §IV
we formalize the proposed peering model, define the peering
optimization problem for selecting the best places to peer,
show the NP-hardness of the problem, and design heuristics to
solve it. §V details our procedure to gather a realistic data set
on base station locations, design a simulated cellular network,
and evaluate the heuristics using the simulation. Finally, we
conclude our work in §VI.

as ‘reward spectrum’ to the operator, and (2) the government
provides infrastructure support. Similar work has been done
by Tang et al. in [15]. Reward-based spectrum sharing models
usually require providers to adhere to regulations set by a
third party, which may cause providers to lose interest in the
agreement. Our wireless peering proposal tends to eradicate
this problem where no third party is involved. The providers
can peer among themselves for their mutual benefits (revenue
maximization) and ensure that the customer satisfaction levels
are maintained or exceeded.
A plethora of inter-provider spectrum sharing policy mechanisms has been studied that involve device-level coordination. A real-time spectrum auction framework for distributing
spectrum among a large number of users under interference
constraints was discussed in [16]. Their method can achieve
conflict-free spectrum allocation, which increases spectrum
utilization and maximizes auction revenue. [17] showed a noncooperative game framework to share the licensed spectrum
among devices subscribed to different providers.

II. BACKGROUND AND M OTIVATION

Wireless peering refers to a settlement-free exchange of
service. An increasing number of wired ISPs have established
peering relationships. However, to our best knowledge, no
work has been done on wireless peering. Unlike wired ISPs,
the cellular market is designed in a very competitive manner,
and any collaboration among providers comes with stringent
rules and hefty payments. We propose a lightweight model that
is effective in allowing providers to collaborate. Customers
can benefit from an improved QoS in both in-network and
out-of-network areas. Since the cellular market is private, the
major driving forces for innovation are customer contentment
and retention, which translates into an increase in revenues
and profits in the long run. Wireless peering allows users to
automatically join a secondary provider in case their primary
provider is not available. It increases customer trust on the
provider and overall satisfaction. From a provider’s point
of view, peering costs nothing extra and is flexible enough
to employ a trial and error approach for optimal contract
formation. Nonetheless, in this paper, we discuss in detail what
aspects affect optimal area selection for peering.
Peering can cause congestion in densely populated areas,
which require additional infrastructure for decent provisioning
of cellular services like temporary software optimizations, e.g.,
radio resource allocation tuning and opportunistic connection
sharing for large scale events [18]. Moreover, peering in highly
volatile traffic areas may result in overloaded BSs due to a high
volume of customers, causing connection failures and poor
QoS. Another glaring problem is free-riding. Customers can
knowingly or unknowingly subscribe to the cheaper provider
option but continue using a peering connection from a different
provider. Similar to recent works, e.g., [19], our wireless
peering model also has room for exploitation from freeriders. One solution to this problem can be peered cellular
providers’ agreement not to serve each others’ customers other
than the agreed-upon locations. This will give a leeway for

Incentivizing competitor service providers for collaboration
to increase larger good (e.g., better overall QoS to users and
reduced social cost) has been a challenge tackled in several
markets, particularly where the service being provided to the
users require multiple providers to cooperate. Network service
provisioning is, arguably, the most fitting case for this scenario.
No single provider’s infrastructure can cover every location in
the world or a country. Hence, the providers should cooperate
in providing a service with large enough coverage and quality
acceptable to their users. However, due to the competitiveness
of business goals, the providers still need effective mechanisms
that provide healthy markets for sharing.
A. Existing Models of Inter-Provider Collaboration
The research community has investigated various methods
for leveraging benefits of roaming to improve customer experience. The work done in [6] is about a global mobility management framework for supporting seamless roaming across wireless networks. Most local providers in the US have contracts to
provide domestic roaming services to their customers, which
is generally included with most cellular plans at no additional
fee. However, on the user end, domestic roaming providers
often impose various restrictions on aliens (i.e., subscribed
to another provider) customers [7]–[10]. [11] proposed an
improvement of mobile data services by implementing public wireless LANs for supporting inter-operator roaming. In
addition, the authors investigate Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM) and web-based authentication methods for current and
occasional users.
The government reward-based model is one way for promoting spectrum sharing among competitors. Some models
employ game-theoretic approaches and use auctions in dynamic spectrum sharing [12], [13]. In [14], the authors devise
two models: (1) the government allows access to federal bands

B. Pros and Cons of Wireless Peering

TABLE I: Symbols and Notations
Symbol
T
N
αji
Sk
σk
P
Rx

Description
Set of counties
Number of counties
Provider j’s network
coverage area in
county i
Customer k’s speed
score
Customer k’s CSAT
Set of cellular
providers
Provider x’s total
Revenue
Subscription/Peering
Roaming

𝐴

𝐴∩𝐵

𝐵

Symbol
K
K
Cji
Qk
Ti
rXY
fx

Description
Set of customers
Number of customers
Provider j’s network
coverage score in
county i
Customer k’s signal
score
Total area of county i
Roaming fee from
provider X to Y
Provider x’s avg.
subscription fee

PEERING
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Fig. 2: Alice and Bob can connect to visiting provider B and
A respectively using either roaming or peering.

the providers to indirectly control free-riding possibilities.
However, designing mechanisms to directly control free-riding
at large scales (i.e., millions of users) is a complex problem
that needs to be solved for any policy framework which
enables pervasive spectrum sharing [20] among operators.
III. W IRELESS P EERING : BASICS AND C ONCEPTS
We describe wireless peering from the point of view of
users and providers, and compare it with roaming. Figure 2
illustrates two users, Alice and Bob, who can connect to their
home provider using the default subscription link. Also, they
can get service outside of the home provider using either a
peering link or a roaming link:
• Service via Roaming: If Alice connects to B’s BSs using
a roaming connection, this does not explicitly cost Alice
anything1 . However, there is an associated cost that A
has to pay B, which eventually gets (indirectly) reflected
on Alice’s bill as A has to recover the roaming expenses.
• Service via Peering: If Alice connects to B’s BSs via
peering, this costs nothing to her. Due to a settlement-free
peering agreement between A and B, A does not have to
pay any fees to B. In our proposed peering framework, if
users travel to outside of home network, they get treated
as a primary user by the peered providers, and none of the
restrictions mentioned in Figure 2 are applied to them. We
1 In

most countries, roaming fees to users do not exist anymore.

TABLE II: U.S. Domestic Roaming Restrictions [7]–[10]
Provider
At&t
Verizon
T-Mobile
Sprint

Speed
2G
2G/3G
2G
2G

Data Allowance
100 MB/mo
200 MB/mo
200 MB/mo

have summarized different restrictions that carriers often
impose on roaming services in Table II.
Roaming is primarily about improving coverage, while
peering goes beyond it and addresses other components that
affect QoS. In addressing issues of strengthening coverage
and the QoS received by customers, peering can incentivize
collaboration among the providers without additional costs.
In this work, we aim to outline a framework for establishing
effective peering contracts for wireless providers. A can extend
its coverage via a roaming agreement with B in areas that it
covers. This incurs roaming costs, as we discussed above. In
a typical roaming agreement, B does not have to serve all
users of A if B’s network is highly congested. However, in
the case of wireless peering, both providers will treat each
others’ customers as primary users and will not charge any
fees. Hence, in peering, there will be an additional implicit
cost of serving peer users.
In the case of roaming, let us define rAB as the roaming
cost A has to pay B for allowing A’s users to connect to
B’s network. Similarly, rBA can be defined as the roaming
fees that B has to pay A for allowing B’s users to connect
to A’s network. In peering, we can define the additional
cost incurred by A for handling B’s users as ρB→A . This
can include multiple direct and indirect costs, like additional
power consumption or additional congestion on A’s network.
Similarly, we can define the additional cost incurred by B
for handling A’s users as ρA→B . Now, in a fashion similar
to wireline peering (§I-A), if ρB→A < rAB , it means the
cost of handling B’s users is lower than the roaming cost and
therefore A will be willing to peer with B. In order for such
a peering relation to be viable, a reciprocal situation should
be happening for B, i.e. ρA→B < rBA . If these conditions
are satisfied for both A and B, then establishing a peering
relationship reduces the social cost associated with roaming
since ρA→B + ρB→A < rAB + rBA . This holds only under
the assumption that providers have enough capacity to handle
additional users, which we will discuss in the sequel.
The effect of peering and roaming on the total provider
revenue can be formulated using the equations given in Fig.
2. Assume, provider A has KA customers, and each of them is
charged a monthly subscription fee, fA . Similarly, KB and fB
are defined for B. Thus, provider A and B generate revenues
KA fA and KB fB , respectively, from subscription fees. If both
maintain a roaming agreement, their overall revenues depend
r
on costs they pay to each other, i.e., RA
= KA fA −rAB +rBA
r
and RB = KB fB − rBA + rAB . However, if A and B form
a peering agreement, their revenues will be RA = KA fA −
ρB→A and RB = KB fB − ρA→B .
The peering cost due to handling peer’s users, i.e., ρB→A

for A, depends on many factors. The most important of which
is the number of peer users one has to serve. It depends on
the sizes and coverage of the peering providers, which we
will discuss shortly in §III-A. Intuitively, the peering cost on
the individual providers will be near zero if they have enough
r
capacity to handle the peer’s users. In such cases, RA < RA
if A has large enough idle capacity to serve B’s users since
ρB→A → 0. From a policy standpoint, this revenue model
also motivates the providers to increase their capacity at areas
where the peer’s customers are more likely to appear, which
eventually leads to an increase in the total coverage of all
providers. However, it is also possible that the peering cost
may become unacceptable by the providers if the number
of users from the peer is too large. There are two ways a
provider can control the peering cost according to our peering
framework: (1) By properly selecting a provider to peer and
(2) By negotiating places to peer. We will discuss these next.
A. Identifying Potential Peers: Affinity Test
Peering between two providers A and B is beneficial when
there are areas where only one has coverage. Such regions
present an opportunity to collaborate and help to improve QoS
for each others’ customers. However, the presence of these
areas should be symmetrical, i.e., the place where only A has
coverage should be similar to the area size where only B has
coverage. If that is not the case, there can be an imbalance in
the potential benefits of a peering agreement, and therefore it
will not be a stable relationship. We define αA to be the area
covered by A but not B, αB to be the area covered by B but
not A, and αA∩B to be the area covered by both A and B
as shown in Fig. 2. If these two providers peer, we formulate
the percentage increase in the coverage areas of A and B as
follows:
αA
αB
ψB = 100
. (1)
ψA = 100
αA∩B + αA
αA∩B + αB
If ψA and ψB are non-zero numbers, it shows potential for a
peering relationship. If either one of the two is zero, it indicates
a peering agreement may not benefit both providers. We refer
to ψA and ψB as the provider’s respective affinity scores. If two
providers have non-zero affinity scores, it shows the potential
of peering as there exist some areas where only one of them
has coverage.
B. Identifying Potential Areas for Peering
A high-affinity score between two providers does not necessarily translate to a stable and mutually beneficial peering
relationship. The peering providers need to negotiate and
decide which areas and BSs will be the places where they will
serve each others’ users. We take a probabilistic approach to
avoid potential congestion and limit peering to areas where
traffic overload is unlikely. Since usage patterns are not
publicly known, we merge county-level (a political subdivision
of the states in the US) population and BS location data to
estimate BS capacity and load. A detailed discussion can be
found about the data and methods used in §V. BSs in densely
populated areas are expected to handle many users and can

therefore be unavailable for peering due to overloading. On
the other hand, BSs in regions with low populations can be
under-utilized because of a few connected users. Therefore,
they can be considered available for peering as they will have
enough capacity to handle more users. In the absence of realworld traffic, these approximations can be used to select areas
where peering will be viable and not result in over-loaded BSs.
This paper focuses on formalizing the problem of choosing the
best peering areas and offering heuristics to solve it.
IV. W IRELESS P EERING : A S IMPLIFIED F ORMAL M ODEL
A. Customer Satisfaction
The American Customer Satisfaction Index lists key aspects
that contribute towards customer experience in the context
of a cellular network. We select the ones correlating to our
proposed peering model and define CSAT as these elements
function. CSAT gives an approximation of a customer’s overall
network experience in the pre-connection, e.g., service availability, and the post-connection phase, e.g., Internet speed.
1) Network Coverage: We use BS locations to approximate
county network coverage area as percentage of its total area.
Using county area as reference allows us to localize the effect
of network coverage on customer satisfaction. We normalize
network coverage in a specific county i to 0 and 1:
αji
, i ∈ T , j ∈ P,
(2)
Cij =
T [i]
where P is the set of providers, T is the set of counties, αji
is the network coverage area in square kilometers of provider
j in county i, and T [i] is the total area of county i.
2) Signal Quality: Signal strength depends directly on lineof-sight (LOS) distance between the BS and the receiver. For
simplicity, we ignore other factors affecting signal strength and
define the it using the inverse square law:
1
Qk = 2 , k ∈ K
(3)
rk
where K is the set of customers and rk is the LOS unit distance
between customer k and the closest BS. Qk is normalized
between 0 and 1.
3) Speed: If a large number of cellular devices are connected to the same BS, customers are expected to experience
reduced transfer rates. We assess consumer satisfaction specifically with access speed by comparing provider-advertised
expected upload/download rates to the actual speed. We define
the network speed score Sk for customer k ∈ C as:
(
Dk
, Dk ≤ D̂k
Dˆk
Sk =
(4)
1,
Dk > D̂k
where Dk is the actual data transfer speed that the customer
experiences and D̂k is the provider advertised speed. Assuming that all connected users consume a similar bandwidth
on average, data transfer speed attenuates with each new
connection added in excess of the BS load capacity. Dk can
be defined as a function of the number of active connections:

◦
D̂k (1 − Λū−u ), ū > u◦
Dk =
(5)
Dk ,
ū <= u◦

Willingness to Pay (WTP)

1.0
0.8
0.6

WTP vs. CSAT
s=5
s=15
s=30

0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Customer Satisfaction (CSAT)

1.0

Fig. 3: S-shaped curve [21].

89
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where Λ is the deterioration rate in (0,1), ū is the total number
of active BS connections, and u◦ is the BS load capacity
in terms of the number of active connections it can handle
without any reduction in individual bandwidth.
4) CSAT: We take the geometric mean of the three components to define the CSAT which is normalized between 0 and
1. The CSAT for provider j’s customer k in county i is:
p
(6)
σkij = 3 Cij Qki Ski
P
P
where Qki = |J1ki | u∈Jki Qkiu , Ski = |J1ki | u∈Jki Skiu ,
and Jki is the set of all positions customer k has been to in
county i. Since we are using a geometric mean, if any one
of the three matrices equals 0, the entire satisfaction score
becomes 0. It also allows us to accurately capture the law of
diminishing marginal returns, which in this context means that
after some optimal level of QoS is achieved, improving QoS
further will result in smaller increases in customer satisfaction.
CSAT for provider j’s network can then be calculated as the
average CSAT of all of its customers, i.e.:
1 X 1 X
σj =
σkji
(7)
|Kj |
|T |
k∈Kj

i∈T

where Kj is the set of customers of provider j.
B. Providers’ Revenue
We outline CSAT’s relation to customers’ Willingness To
Pay (WTP) and develop an economic model for the providers’
revenue.
1) Willingness to Pay: Homburg et al. [21] use the Prospect
Theory to present a functional structure to describe the relation
between CSAT and WTP. If CSAT increases, customers are
willing to pay more. Fig. 3 shows the S-shaped curve that
represents empirical data collected from a research study
conducted in the context of a restaurant. Assuming the cellular
market follows a similar trend, we capture the effect of CSAT
on WTP in the following equation:
1
(8)
1 + e−s(σkj −t)
where s and t are constants to normalize the values between
0 and 1, and σkj is the customer k’s CSAT using provider
j’s service, which is a weighted average of σkji ’s according
to how much time the customer spends in each county i. The
sensitivity constant, s, defines the steepness of the slope for
wkj =

the relation between customers satisfaction and their WTP. The
higher s, the steeper the slope is, which means that a customer
is susceptible to changes in QoS and vice versa. t represents
a customer’s expectation regarding QoS. A higher t shifts the
curve to the right, suggesting that the customer is willing to
pay if QoS is above a certain level. For the scope of this
paper, we assume that the WTP-CSAT relation is symmetrical,
i.e., wkj = 0.5 at σkj = 0.5. The WTP-CSAT relation is
normalized between 0 and 1 such that wkj → 1 as σkj → 1
and wkj → 0 as σkj → 0, we tune s in (8). Fig. 3 shows how
different s values affect the WTP–CSAT relation.
2) Pricing: Users’ Utility and Demand: The customer has
no control over the price; however, a rational customer’s
reaction to price change directly affects it. Demand-Supply
curve [22] represents this phenomenon. As the price of a
product rises, customers’ willingness to buy, more commonly
known as the demand, falls. We utilize the concept of Utility
and Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility as discussed earlier
in Section IV-A4 to model a customer’s behavior with regards
to demand. Therefore, a rational consumer k subscribed to
provider j should choose the quantity that maximizes his net
utility (or surplus) which we define as:
U (x) − fj x,

(9)

where U (x) is the customer utility that results from consuming
x amount of the product and fj is the unit price that the
customer has to pay the provider j. For customer k, we define
the utility function as Uk (x) = wk ·log(x), wk > 0 where wk
is the WTP of customer k, which is constant that allows us to
give the utility function a dollar value that is comparable to the
product price. x is the quantity of product consumed, e.g., the
amount of wireless data and/or the number of cellular calls.
We derive (9) with respect to quantity (x) and equate it to zero
to calculate the maximum net utility. It yields the well-known
optimal demand and price equilibrium of 0 = Uk0 (x) − fj ,
i.e., 0 = wxk − fj . The relation between price and quantity
demanded can the be derived as
wk
xj (f ) =
(10)
f
Assume WTP, wk , increases because of an increase in customer satisfaction. Then, as explained in §IV-B1, the demand
function proves that the resultant curve will shift rightwards.
Since peering requires no additional costs, this increase in
the price because of the demand shift contributes solely to
an increase in profit.
3) Provider j’s Total Revenue: Providers look to maximize
revenue and profit.P
We define the total revenue of provider j as
follows: Rj = fj k∈K xk (fj ) where fj is the subscription
fee charged to customers, (K) is the provider’s customer set,
and xk (fj ) is the demand function for customer k.
The number of users a provider can handle is upper bounded
by its capacity. Ideally, the demand should equal this capacity.
If it is lower, the provider may reduce the price to increase
demand. If it is higher, increasing the price can reduce the
demand to the desired level. Therefore, the provider needs to

find the optimum price, which we denote as f ∗ , to maximize
the total revenue R.
Using §IV-B2-defined demand function, and assuming the
provider’s eagerness to match the demand and capacity, the
optimum price can be determined as follows:
X
xk (f ∗ ) = c
(11)
k∈K

f∗

X wk
c

=

(12)

k∈K

where c is the capacity and wk is the WTP for customer k. We
see f ∗ depends on the users’ WTP. We have already shown that
peering can raise user WTP by increasing CSAT. Therefore,
we can conclude that peering allows providers to improve enduser QoS and increases the optimum fee, f ∗ . Relating this
change in subscription fee to the revenue function presented
in §III shows that the total provider revenue increases. Since
this comes at no additional cost, the change contributes to the
profit directly:
Kj fj∗

Rj

=

Rj

= Kj

(13)

X wk
c

(14)

k∈K

where Kj is the number of subscribers for provider j.
C. Peering Optimization
Peering candidate and location selection can be defined as
an optimization problem for two providers A and B. As part of
the peering contract, providers need to select peering locations
(counties) to maximize net monetary benefit and increase in
average CSAT for both providers. Since it is a negotiation
process between two providers, it is possible that while one
county offers great potential to provider B, it is not a good
enough peering location for A. Because of this difference
in perspective and that peering is a two-way relationship,
choosing all counties with a net positive CSAT change may
not always be the optimal solution.
Let O PTIMAL P EERING(T , ∆σA , ∆σB ) denote the peering
optimization problem, where T is the set of counties, and ∆σA
and ∆σB are the vectors of CSAT gain for providers A and
B. We write O PTIMAL P EERING as follows:
!
!
X
X
max
∆σAi
∆σBi
(15)
∗
T ⊆T

i∈T ∗

i∈T ∗

s.t. ∆RA , ∆RB ≥ 0
X
X
∆σAi ≥ 0,
∆σBi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ T
i∈T ∗

(16)
(17)

i∈T ∗

Since the CSAT values, ∆σAi and ∆σBi , are in [-1,1],
the maximum possible value of the objective function in (15)
will be N 2 where N = |T |. In this case, all counties are
selected for peering and each provider obtains 100% increase
in its CSAT. Since peering benefit is dependent on each other’s
service quality, the goal for selecting the peering counties T ∗
is to maximize the collective benefit for both providers, which

is the product of the CSAT gains. Thus, the objective function
in (15) maximizes the product of the total CSAT benefit
of the both providers. This is a crucial dynamic since the
closer the individual benefits of the two providers, the stronger
the peering relationship will be (16) and (17), respectively,
assuring no provider looses revenue and has a positive CSAT
gain summed over all selected counties T ∗ .
The complexity of O PTIMAL P EERING is based on the
number of counties N . A search for the best subset of counties,
T ∗ , will involve a running time of O(2N ), as there are
2N subsets of counties. For small N , this may be possible.
However, N can be quite large, and further, the problem can
be solved at finer granularity, e.g., peering locations can be
selected at each cell site instead of county. We show that
O PTIMAL P EERING is NP-hard and present two heuristics.
Algorithm 1 Reduction to Subset Sum
Inputs: T , ∆σA , ∆σB
Output: Set of counties T ∗
N ← |T |
∆σmax ← 100
for x ← 1 : N do
for y ← 1 : N do
L ← ∆σAx .∆σBy
end for
end for
U ← N 2 (∆σmax )2
while U > 0 do
L∗←S UBSET S UM(L, U )
T∗ ←∅
for x ← 1 : N do
if ∆σAx .∆σBx ∈ L∗

then

T∗ ←T∗∪x
end if
end for
for x ← T ∗ do
for y ← T ∗ do
if ∆σAx .∆σBy ∈
/
L∗ then
Go to DECR
end if
end for
end for
DECR: U ← (U − 1)
end while
return L∗

1) NP-Hardness: We show that O PTIMAL P EERING is NPhard by reducing it to Subset Sum, which is one of the NPcomplete problems [23]. Assume that a procedure solves the
S UBSET S UM(L, U ) where L is a set of integers and U is a
target value, and it returns the subset of L that sums to U .
We consider a quantized version of O PTIMAL P EERING
where ∆σA and ∆σB can only be integers. In particular, we
assume σ values are scaled from [0,1] to [0,100] and rounded
to closest integer, i.e., σAi ← b100σAi c and σBi ← b100σBi c,
from their calculation in (7).
We
reduce
O PTIMAL P EERING(T , ∆σA , ∆σB )
to
S UBSET S UM(L, U ) in Algo. 1. It calls S UBSET S UM
with the highest possible U and then decrements it until there
is a solution. The key parameter here is ∆σmax which is set to
100 as the maximum amount of CSAT gain can be 100 after
the quantization. Given this, the highest possible objective
value in (15) can be N 2 (∆σmax )2 , where U is initialized to.
The algorithm sets up a vector N 2 integers that are pairwise
multiplications of ∆σA and ∆σB . Then, the algorithm
inspects the returned solution L∗ from S UBSET S UM. Two
conditions must satisfy in order for the solution to be valid
for O PTIMAL P EERING: (1) If a county x is selected, the
product of the CSAT gains of A and B for x must be in the

solution. (2) For all selected counties, all pairwise products
of the CSAT gains of A and B on those counties must be in
the solution. In the first for loop inside the while loop, the
algorithm inspects the integers selected by S UBSET S UM and
composes the list of selected counties. In the next nested for
loop, it checks whether all pairwise products of CSAT gains
on those selected counties are included.
Finally, as another requirement for NP-hardness proof, the
reduction algorithm runs in polynomial time. In particular, the
complexity of the algorithm is O(N 5 ∗ (∆σmax )2 ), since the
while loop runs N 2 ∗ (∆σmax )2 times and each iteration takes
O(N 3 ) time due to the for loops.
D. Heuristic Approaches
Since finding the optimal selection of counties is NP-hard,
we employ two heuristic approaches that allow us to make an
informed county selection for peering.
1) Population Density Threshold: Congestion directly relates to population; we avoid densely or moderately populated
areas and choose counties for peering with population density
below a particular threshold value. Fig. 4 shows the providers’
net benefit with increasing threshold. Most of the counties
in Texas are sparsely populated, making them feasible for
peering. If the threshold is too high after a certain point,
peering is not as beneficial and, in some cases, can hurt CSAT.
We find the population density threshold for each peering contract beyond which the benefit from peering remains
negligible (under 1%). The lowest of these values is 89th
percentile, for Verizon-AT&T. Taking a conservative approach,
we consider this the optimal threshold for county selection,
which is 235 persons per km2 for Texas. Finally, we assess
the performance of the heuristic in later sections.
Algorithm 2 County Selection: Sorted Sum
Inputs: T̄ , ∆σA , ∆σB
Output: Set of counties T ∗
T ∗ = {}
function SORTED S UM(T̄ ,∆σA , ∆σB )
n ← |T̄ |
if n = 1 then
return [max(0, ∆σAi ), max(0, ∆σBi )]
end if
[sumA, sumB] ← SORTED S UM(T̄ [0 : n − 1], ∆σA , ∆σB )
if selecting i increases net gain then
T ∗ .insert(i ∈ T̄ )
return [sumA+∆σAi , sumB+∆σBi ]
else
return [sumA, sumB]
end if
end function
Reverse Sort T̄ by ∆σAi ∆σBi
SORTED S UM (T̄ , ∆σA , ∆σB )
return T ∗

2) Sorted Sum: Given ∆σji and ∆σj 0 i for providers j and
j in all counties i ∈ T , we discard counties if both providers
are losing in terms of CSAT (∆σji < 0 and ∆σj 0 i < 0). The
rest of the values are sorted in reverse order of ∆σji ∆σj 0 i
which we refer to as T̄ . This allows us to give the highest
0

Fig. 5: BS Location heat map for AT&T in Texas.

preference to counties where both providers are gaining at a
similar level, and the less preference to counties where one
of the providers is gaining less than the other. To select T ∗ ,
we use a recursive solution as shown in Algo. 2 that ensures
maximum net benefit (15) in the given order of counties.
Starting from the last county n ∈ T̄ , we select it if it increases
the net benefit, i.e.,


 


n
n
n−1
n−1
X
X
X
X

∆σji  
∆σj 0 i  > 
∆σji  
∆σj 0 i 
i∈T̄

i∈T̄

i∈T̄

i∈T̄

(18)
where i∈T̄ ∆σji is calculated recursively. Since the list is
sorted, we are able to get T ∗ in linear time complexity. While
this heuristic-based selection does not give the global maximum net benefit, it performs much better than the population
density threshold heuristic.
Pn−1

V. S IMULATION AND A NALYSIS
We employ a systematic and practical approach to evaluating the role and impact of peering in wireless networks. We
design and develop a simulator that mimics the real-world
wireless network and allows us to characterize the modus
operandi of cellular networks. Besides, it helps us study the
relation between peering, end-user QoS, and its effect on the
provider’s net earnings.
A. Data Set
We used several data-sets for the evaluation setup:
OpenCellID: It is the largest crowd-sourced data-set for BS
locations [24]. Cellular signal data is collected using mobile
application installed by volunteers. This raw data is then used
to map BS locations.
Networks and Subscriptions: The OpenCellID data does
not provide information regarding which provider each BS
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belongs to. However, it does include Mobile Country Code
(MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC) for each BS. We use
public networks and subscriptions [25] to identify the provider
for each of the BS in the OpenCellID data.
State and County Boundaries: We identified the State
and County each BS is located in using the US Cartographic
Boundary from the Census Bureau’s TIGER database and the
BS latitude/longitude values [26], [27].
State and County Population: To estimate customer presence, we used the US CENSUS data that provides State and
County level population data [28].
We design a virtual cellular network consisting of BSs and
mobile users. Using the data sets discussed above, we ensure
that their numbers, locations, and properties are as close to
reality as possible. Thus, the simulated BSs accurately represent the real-world BSs, and the simulated users accurately
represent the real-world users. Fig. 5 shows a geographical
heat map that we drew using the BS location data for AT&T
in Texas. It is seen that the BS density is particularly high
in major cities. Also, it should be noted that these maps are
not representative of the provider coverage as that varies with
each type of BS.
We believe this simulator can be used for different experiments in this area of research. Therefore, we have made its
source code and the compiled data set publicly available2 . The
performance of different pricing or spectrum sharing models
can be tested using the same underlying network. In addition,
making the code publicly available will allow researchers to
contribute to this tool and improve its accuracy and efficiency.
In this paper, we limit the extent of our experimentation
using this simulator to only Texas, the second largest and the
second most populated state in the US. It also has the highest
number of counties (254). Since the majority of our analysis
is county specific, Texas provides the most diverse range of
densely and sparsely populated counties, allowing us to test
our model in a variety of different scenarios, representing the
majority of the rest of the US.
2 https://github.com/shahzebmustafa/Wireless-Peering-Simulator
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B. Simulation
1) Providers & Customers: We combine the data from
OpenCellID and the MCCs, MNCs as discussed in Section
V-A. We use GeoJSON-generated data to determine in which
county each BS is located. GeoJSON data allows us to
generate polygons with the exact dimensions for each of the
county boundaries and calculate the county coverage area for
each provider (which is upper bounded by its geographical
nS
ji
area) as αji =
πr̄b2 , where nji is the total number of BSs
b=0

in county i for provider j, and r̄b is BS b’s maximum signal
range. We calculate the total provider coverage area with the
following assumptions about the BS: (1) BS r̄b depends on the
radio type, Table III; (2) All BSs have at least three antennas,
hence the total area that a BS covers will always be sphere;
and (3) No interference among the BSs themselves.
We generate users with random locations and movements by
employing the following constraints to make user interaction
with our virtual network more realistic: (1) The number of
users in a county is directly proportional to its local population;

(2) The number of users of a provider is directly proportional
to its BS count in a county; (3) The user mostly remain
within the county that they belong to, and therefore are most
concerned by their local cellular Quality-of-Service (QoS).
2) Measurement: We initialize our simulation by generating a programmable county map of Texas with BSs and users.
While the BSs are positioned on pre-computed coordinates
from OpenCellID, user locations are selected at random within
their respective counties. We scale down the actual population
1
ρi resident users where
of each county and we generate 1,000
ρi is the population for county i. These users are then divided
into four groups proportional to the number BSs, one for each
provider. We set the maximum data transfer speed of each BS
based on its radio type from Table III, provided in OpenCellID
data. To account for the scaled-down number of customers, we
also scale down a BS’s load capacity u◦ to only one per BS.
The data transfer rate sees an exponential decay with each
added connection to the BS. While the rate of this decay
depends on various factors, for this simulation, we use it as
0.05, i.e., 5% reduction in speed of all connected users for
every new connection. User movements are probabilistically
restricted within their local county, i.e., a user’s next (randomly
selected) location is in their local county with 90% probability.
The movement to other counties is analogous to a trip for
1 – 10 iterations. Every time user location is updated, User
Equipment (UE) sends connection requests to all BSs within
their range. In doing so, preference is given to the user’s
primary provider’s BS. If other BSs offer a significantly better
signal quality, which we measure using LoS distance, then
connection requests are sent to them also. This request is not
accepted in the absence of a roaming or peering contract,
in which case UE sends a connection request to increase
LoS distance. Once a BS accepts the connection request, we
calculate the signal strength, Qk , coverage area score, Cij ,
and the speed score, Sk . The speed score is the ratio of the
actual speed, which depends on BS load, to the expected speed,
which depends on the radio type from Table III. Coverage area
score is the ratio of the coverage area in county i for provider
j, which is calculated as described earlier in Section V-B1,
to the county area. Similarly, signal strength is calculated as
shown in (3) using LoS distance r from the BS. We use these
measurements to calculate the average CSAT score for each
user over 100 simulation iterations.
C. Results
1) Peering in Individual County: We observe the peering
model in each county individually and take measurements
to record user CSATs at each location until it converges
to a stable value. We perform it for all counties as part
of a two-staged measurement study. In the first stage, we
calculate average county CSATs for each provider, assuming
none have any peering or roaming agreement. We use the same
measurement techniques in the second stage with a bilateral
peering agreement at all locations. We run six simulations for
all possible peering combinations among four providers and
compare the average CSAT values from the two stages. Fig. 7

summarizes the findings for two peering contracts: T–Mobile
with Sprint and Verizon with AT&T.
2) Impact of Coverage Area: For each peering contract,
we calculate the CSAT gain ∆σ for all counties, indicating
the change in average provider CSAT score due to peering.
Since this change is different for each provider, it is possible
that only one of the providers can benefit from a peering
relation in the given county. To design a county selection
criteria, we analyze the relation between ∆σ and the difference
in county coverage between the two providers. We use the
percentage change in provider CSAT relative to its score. The
intuition behind this method is that for a provider, improving
the CSAT score becomes more complex as it moves closer to
1. It happens because of the diminishing nature of the CSAT
function. Therefore, we calculate the relative CSAT gain as a
percentage of 1 − σ where σji is provider j’s CSAT score in
county i without peering.
Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b illustrate the relation between CSAT
gains and differences in the coverage scores Cji between the
provider j (requester) and j 0 (candidate) in county i. As the
difference between network coverage increases, CSAT gain
also increases at a different rate for both providers. If the
difference is high, providers with the lower average CSAT
are expected to benefit more from a peering contract. If
the difference between ∆σ increases with moving further
along the x-axis, it becomes more like a customer-provider
relationship rather than a collaborative one. As the coverage
difference reduces, both providers have a similar QoS in those
locations and hence more potential for peering. Since Sprint
and T-Mobile are identical in size, they both can benefit from
peering. However, in the case of AT&T and Verizon, peering
is largely beneficial only for Verizon.
At&t has the best service in Texas in all aspects: coverage
area, data speed and signal quality. With no coverage in 45
counties, Verizon scores the lowest on our scale. The results
reported in Figure 7 show that bilateral peering is more
beneficial for the provider with worse coverage. Compared
to Verizon, At&t has a much better QoS in most of the
counties, which is why Verizon doesn’t have much to offer
with peering. However, since T-Mobile and Sprint both have
comparable cellular coverage, peering is mutually beneficial
for both of them. We choose these two pairs specifically to
illustrate how the effectiveness of peering is highly dependent
on how comparable in size the two providers are.
3) Peering vs. Revenue Gain: We execute a two-stage
experiment for the entire state instead of a single county. As
described in Section V-B2, users can travel to other counties;
some part of their CSAT score now also depends on the QoS
in other counties that they visit. We use proposed heuristic
county selection procedure from Section IV-D to get T ∗ . We
enable peering in all counties in T ∗ and simulate ≈30,000
customers. In both stages, we collect the average CSAT scores
as reported in Figure 6. The bar charts show the change in
average CSAT for each provider, and peering always yields
better results when compared to roaming. The performance of
both heuristics, T and SS, remains similar, although SS does

tend to perform better in more cases.
We use (14) with c = 100 to calculate the change in price
primarily caused by this increase in CSAT. For different values
of the consumer sensitivity constant s, we observe the gain
in revenue each provider can expect with wireless peering.
When the sensitivity is too low, wireless spectrum market
moves towards a commodity market, and there is no benefit
to use wireless peering. When the sensitivity is too high, the
customers are content with paying higher fees for even a
slightly better QoS. Both of these scenarios are highly unlikely
to occur since the wireless spectrum is a scarce resource
and not probable to become a commodity without any major
breakthrough. Furthermore, it is implausible that the wireless
spectrum becomes so scarce as to make it a luxury. It is fair to
assume that as long as the demand is sufficient, providers will
continue striving to make the spectrum market more efficient.
VI. S UMMARY AND D ISCUSSION
Despite significant developments in wireless networks,
County-wide cellular service in the US remains unreliable at
large. In addition, the mobility of cellular users makes the mass
deployment of new technology particularly difficult. wireless
peering aims to act as a trustworthy model that cellular
providers can use to collaborate. We tested wireless peering on
a virtual cellular network and our experimental results show
great potential in terms of cellular service and provider revenue. In addition, T-Mobile and Sprint have officially merged,
reaffirming our simulation results as they offer the highest
potential in terms of revenue gain and QoS improvement.
We have identified various limitations of wireless peering,
including free-riding and the lack of publicly available accurate cellular and user mobility data. No government approved
or official data set for accurate GPS positioning and configuration for BSs is publicly available. The data provided by
the Federal Communications Commission is incomplete. It
only contains position data for registered cell towers and BSs.
Quite often this registration is associated with a third party
management entity, which means that a specific carrier’s cell
towers can rarely be identified using this data. In addition to
that, not all BSs (specifically micro BSs) need to be registered
with a central authority. Nevertheless, we were able to design
a solid theoretical and empirical model for wireless peering.
We aim to improve the county or BS selection for peering by
employing stronger heuristics and experimenting with dynamic
selection models, that make decisions based on live traffic
patterns. We believe that despite several limitations in this
prefatory design, wireless peering has the potential to become
a reality and be deployed worldwide.
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